Performance-based design of road tunnel fire safety: Proposal of new Swedish framework  by Gehandler, Jonatan et al.
Case Studies in Fire Safety 1 (2014) 18–28Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Case Studies in Fire Safety
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /csfsPerformance-based design of road tunnel ﬁre safety: Proposal
of new Swedish frameworkhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csfs.2014.01.002
2214-398X  2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 105165090
E-mail address: jonatan.gehandler@sp.se (J. Gehandler).
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Jonatan Gehandler a,⇑, Haukur Ingason a, Anders Lönnermark a, Håkan Frantzich b,
Michael Strömgren a
a SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, Box 857, SE-501 15 Borås, Sweden
b Lund University, Box 118, SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 21 January 2014
Accepted 29 January 2014
Available online 10 February 2014
Keywords:
Tunnel ﬁre safety
Performance-based requirements
Design
VeriﬁcationThis paper contains a proposal of new Swedish framework for performance-based design of
road tunnel ﬁre safety derived from Swedish and European regulation. The overall purpose
of the guideline is to protect life, health, property, environment, and key societal functions
from ﬁre. The guideline is structured into ﬁve key groups of requirements: #1 Proper man-
agement and organisation, #2 to limit the generation and spread of ﬁre and smoke, #3 to
provide means for safe self-evacuation, #4 to provide means and safety for the rescue ser-
vice, and #5 to ensure load-bearing capacity of the construction. Each group contains a
hybrid of prescriptive requirements, performance-based requirements, and acceptable
solutions. Prescriptive requirements must be fulﬁlled, however, it is the choice of the
design team to either adopt the proposed acceptable solutions, or to design alternative
solutions by verifying that performance-based requirements are satisﬁed. For veriﬁcation
of performance-based requirements through risk analysis the operational, epistemic, and
aleatory uncertainties are considerable. Therefore, a scenario-based risk analysis with sev-
eral speciﬁed input variables and methods is recommended for veriﬁcation of #3 and #5.
Indispensable complements are scenario exercises, emergency exercises and similar meth-
ods that validate the design and highlight organisational aspects. The proposed design
guide has been developed by the authors together with the advisory group established
for the work.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Catastrophic tunnel ﬁres such as the Mont Blanc ﬁre in 1999 have highlighted the potential consequences of such events.
In the Mont Blanc case many people lost their lives, and the tunnel remained closed for several years [1]. In 2004 The Euro-
pean commission issued a directive on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network [2].
Despite the directive and several national laws on tunnel safety, at large there is a lack of agreement regarding what con-
stitutes tunnel safety and how veriﬁcation of safety should be performed. Swedish stakeholders have a diversiﬁed view on
this subject, it is to some degree unclear what constitutes ﬁre safety, what an acceptable ﬁre safety level should be and which
roles different stakeholders have [3,4].
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In practice, due to several prescriptive requirements, there is a limited possibility for safety trade-offs. Furthermore, there is
an imbalance, as most measures focus on reducing consequences instead of reducing the likelihood of occurrence. This is
often due to predeﬁned design ﬁre requirements in which the ﬁre has already been assumed to have happened, i.e. likelihood
of occurrence is not emphasized. It was realised that future research should focus on developing the concept of acceptable
performance and risk if we are to be able to consider safety trade-offs [4]. Therefore a project was initiated by the Swedish
Transport Administration (STA) with the goal to develop performance-based ﬁre safety guidelines. The purpose of this paper
is to present a concept for more performance-based guidelines which would allow for risk-based design and for safety trade-
offs, e.g., technical trade-offs between ﬁre suppression and ﬁre resistance.
The general idea of the new tunnel guideline was to resemble the procedure from the building regulation. By doing so it is
hoped that the building industry will be familiar with the structure and procedure.Legal requirements and political objectives
Several legal requirements and political objectives inﬂuence how a tunnel is designed and therefore also what require-
ments the tunnel must fulﬁl. The overall requirement for Swedish road infrastructure is to ensure a socio-economic efﬁcient
and sustainable provision of transport for citizens and industry throughout the country. Keywords are availability, safety,
environment and health [5]. On a legal level the planning and building act [6] and the planning and building ordinance
[7] applies to tunnels as they are construction works. In this ordinance ﬁve basic ﬁre safety requirements for structures
can be identiﬁed from the EU Construction Products Directive (CPD). For tunnels the act on safety in road tunnels [8] and
the ordinance on safety in road tunnels [9] further specify the requirements set out in the EC directive. Other laws concern-
ing crisis management [10,11], ﬁre safety management [12,13], and the prevention of accidents [14] also sets requirements
for the performance of tunnel ﬁre safety. Speciﬁc requirements for buildings are issued by the Swedish National Board of
Housing [15].The Swedish building code
The current building code is, compared to previous editions, updated and re-written to better provide the designer with
performance-based regulations and general recommendations supporting the requirements. As not all requirements can be
formulated in a performance-based manner some prescriptive requirements still exist. The code separates the requirements
from the recommendations which in turn provide guidelines for how the requirements can be fulﬁlled. The level of safety is
then deﬁned by the use of the general recommendations but they are not mandatory and other solutions to the requirements
may be obtained by performance-based methods which fulﬁls the requirements, but not the general recommendations. The
designer has to follow all prescriptive requirements.
The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and planning [16] also issued guidelines for the veriﬁcation method for
performance-based solutions (known as the analytical design option). This guideline provides the designer with a
recommended procedure for how to verify that the building meets the requirements. The guideline also includes information
on practical design issues. The most frequently used formal base for the veriﬁcation is the scenario-based risk analysis. The
designer can apply other higher order methods like a quantitative risk analysis but also more qualitative methods. However,
for these latter methods there are no detailed recommendations presented apart from the general procedures on
performance-based design.
The performance-based procedure in the guideline presents a four step approach that has to be followed.
 Identiﬁcation of the veriﬁcation needs.
 Veriﬁcation of a sufﬁcient ﬁre safety level.
 Review of the veriﬁcation.
 Documentation of the ﬁre safety measures in the building (including the performed control).
An important part of the procedure is the ﬁrst two steps. The ﬁrst step is used to identify the boundary conditions for the
analysis and dependencies within the ﬁre safety system. The second step includes a risk identiﬁcation task aiming at iden-
tifying potential scenarios that are relevant for further analysis. There are no explicitly given scenario locations for each
building type but the risk identiﬁcation is supposed to provide the designer with a proper baseline for the ensuing
veriﬁcations.Theoretical framework for safe design
Performance-based design has become more common in several areas, for example within the building industry. In order
to implement performance-based requirements for tunnels, functional requirements must be speciﬁed specifying the
function and purpose of the tunnel from a ﬁre safety perspective.
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Uncertainty is a fundamental phenomenon reﬂecting incomplete knowledge. Three types of uncertainty can be identiﬁed
from literature to highlight different aspects. Aleatory uncertainty represents randomness, i.e. natural variations in samples.
Epistemic uncertainty concerns the knowledge base and how well any model being used represents the real phenomenon
[17]. Operational uncertainty is due to errors and assumptions being made by the analyst group and explain variations found
in benchmarking exercises on risk analysis despite that the same data, theory and methods were used [18].
According to Morgan and Henrion [17] empirical quantities representing properties or states of the world can be repre-
sented by probability distributions. Epistemic and model uncertainties are in principle very difﬁcult to capture in numerical
terms, and since they do not represent real states of the world, it does not make sense to express them with probability dis-
tributions. Uncertainty can also be expressed in other ways, for example in words by stating the knowledge base and
assumptions being made, or by a parametric sensitivity analysis.
Uncertainty can be treated in different ways and to a different extent. Depending on the problem context, available data
and resources, a suitable level of uncertainty treatment can be aimed for. Paté-Cornell (1996) proposes six different levels in
relation to risk analysis.
Level 0: Hazard detection and failure modes identiﬁcation. We know what can happen, this might be sufﬁcient for a strict
zero-risk policy.
 Level 1: Worst case approach. This can be an option if the worst case is sufﬁcient to support a decision, but it can be
difﬁcult to determine what ‘worst’ is.
 Level 2: Plausible worst case. This can be an option if we want to know a reasonable and plausible upper bound,
however, it can be difﬁcult to decide how plausible a certain case is.
 Level 3: Best estimates and central value. This reﬂects the most probable outcome and is often used for Cost and
Beneﬁt Analysis (CBA). Since nothing is said about the uncertainty involved it is impossible to predict likely
ﬂuctuations.
 Level 4: Probabilistic risk assessment, single risk curve. An output in terms of a probabilistic curve which displays the
uncertainty involved under the limitations of used method and made assumptions).
 Level 5: Probabilistic risk analysis, multiple curves. This option takes into consideration of competing models and
assumptions.
It will not be possible to categorize all methods according to the levels above, however for risk analysis the categorization
is meaningful.What is safety, and how can it be achieved?
Achieving a safe tunnel covers several different aspects. This is understood through the safety circle which visualize safety
in different sequential stages [19] as a dynamic process of learning and improving, see Fig. 1. It has no beginning and no end.
In any holistic safety work all elements in the safety circle should be addressed, it may be inefﬁcient to only focus on one or a
few measures. Pro-action is about eliminating the root causes, for example through training or design. Prevention is about
reducing tunnel accident probabilities, for example through reduced speed. Preparation is about handling emergencies.
Mitigation is about mitigating the consequences of a tunnel accident. Intervention comes from the efforts of rescue teams.
After-care is about taking actions to return to normal operation. Lastly evaluation is about learning and improving. Safety
features that function early in the circle are in general most cost-effective [19].
Another important aspect when it comes to safety is the fact that most accidents are caused or worsened by organisa-
tional factors [20–22]. Reason [20] classify human error into two groups: latent errors and active errors. Active errors are
often performed by front-line operators and are noticeable as soon as they take place. Latent errors, however, are often per-
formed by agents removed in time and space from the front-line operators, e.g. designers, high-level decision makers, and
maintenance staff. Both active error and latent error are unavoidable, but there is still hope as we can identify them early and
act upon them to continually ensure safety [20]. There are three key realms to improve safety as follows [20,23,24].
 Methods such as total quality management provide a framework for improving and ﬁnding latent conditions.
 Administrative controls: External controls are made up of rules, regulations, and procedures. Internal controls are
derived from training and experience. Ideally combinations of administrative controls conﬁne the natural variability
of human action to safe and productive pathways.
 Engineering principles and methods for safe design: Inherent safety, fail-safe, safety margins, procedural safe-guards,
systems engineering, risk analysis, etc.
Note that the proposed design guide is an administrative and external control, however, it should encourage several
aspects from the sections above in order for safety to be ensured.
Fig. 1. The safety circle visualizes different aspects that contribute to safety.
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The two most common risk analysis methods for road tunnels are characterized by PIARC [25] as scenario-based and sys-
tem-based. A scenario-based approach is qualitative in the way that one or more scenarios are selected upon experience,
knowledge or regulation. It may be either quantitative or qualitative in terms of analysing the outcome of the selected sce-
narios. A system-based approach is a quantitative and probabilistic model, referred to as a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA).
In the Scenario-based approach, a limited set of scenarios is deﬁned. The consequences for each scenario are evaluated
against pre-deﬁned criteria. The frequencies only play a role in the selection of the scenarios. This approach is well suited
for analysis of particular events or planning of emergency response measures. This approach treats uncertainties according
to Paté-Cornell’s level 1, 2, or 3 depending on which scenario or scenarios that are chosen and their likelihood.
Unlike the scenario-based approach where a few scenarios are chosen, in a QRA all scenarios are considered. Both causes
for incidents and system failures and analysis of the consequences are included in the analysis. Usually this is done through
utilizing fault trees and event trees. A QRA correspond to Paté-Cornell’s level 4.
Note, however, that not all requirements and systems can be veriﬁed by risk analysis. Risk analysis requires data and cau-
sal connections to be known for it to be meaningful, e.g. for many administrative and organisational safety measures the
causal connections to end consequences are not well known, despite that the measures are known to be effective [20,26].General requirements and guideline structure
Based on legal requirements, political goals, and latest research, requirements for tunnel ﬁre safety are identiﬁed. An ac-
count of this work process is given in the ﬁnal report of the project [27,28]. The hierarchy and structure of the resulting
guideline can be seen in Fig. 2.
The guideline starts from the overarching aim to protect life, health, property, environment, and key societal functions
from ﬁre. Several requirements exist, mainly derived from laws, to fulﬁl this aim. The guideline starts with an introduction
and general requirements. A key general requirement is that the ﬁre safety protection is robust so that all or a large part of
the protection does not fail by a common cause.
On a high level a safety concept is established for all tunnels, this is a description of key principles and technical, organ-
isational, and administrative measures used to achieve safety. The safety concept is an overarching document presenting the
strategy for safety of the tunnel.
All tunnels are divided into three classes (TA, TB, and TC) depending on trafﬁc volume, amount of heavy goods, and tunnel
length. Secondly there is an additional class (TA⁄, TB⁄, TC⁄) for vulnerable tunnels with special need for protection. A tunnel
can be vulnerable as a whole or concerning one or more speciﬁc requirements. For such cases the prescriptive solutions can
in some cases be increased, or they are judged to be obsolete. Veriﬁcation against performance-based requirements is then
recommended.
Design and veriﬁcation of compliance can either be performed by a simpliﬁed veriﬁcation against pre-speciﬁed accept-
able solutions, or by performance-based design. Performance-based veriﬁcation follow the same procedure as is used for
buildings, see ‘‘The Swedish building code’’. Depending on the complexity of the needed veriﬁcation, the method can either
Fig. 2. Overview of the guideline structure.
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formance-based veriﬁcation are recommendations and that other methods may be used. The only requirement is that the
analysis follows the procedure outlined in ‘‘The Swedish building code’’, and that performance-based requirements are
fulﬁlled.
The ﬁre protection is said to be satisﬁed if one of the following points are met:
 compliance with all requirements of the guidance,
 comparison with a reference tunnel with the resulting protection from applicable acceptable solutions showing
equivalent or higher safety, or
 the criteria given in this guidance for scenario risk analysis are achieved.
After the general requirements the guideline is further structured into six groups of requirements which are as follows:
organisation & management, to limit the generation and spread of ﬁre and smoke, to provide means for safe evacuation, to
provide means and safety for the rescue service, to ensure load-bearing capacity of the construction, and to limit the spread
of ﬁre to neighbouring construction works, see Fig. 3. Each group contains a hybrid of requirements consisting of prescriptive
requirements, performance-based requirements, and acceptable solutions.Main requirements and the performance of tunnel ﬁre safety
From the derived guideline containing all speciﬁcation for ﬁre safety which is appended in the ﬁnal report [27], the most
important performance-based requirements can be identiﬁed. Group number six, limit the spread of ﬁre to neighbouring
construction works, only apply to very speciﬁc tunnels where nearby constructions exist and where these would be at risk.
However, the other ﬁve groups of requirements are of signiﬁcant importance for the overall performance.
Depending on the chosen safety concept, different systems can become critical for the overall safety. The safety concept
will therefore affect, and to some extent, deﬁne the requirements for such systems (e.g. ventilation, ﬁxed ﬁre suppression
systems, evacuation, or load-bearing capacity).Organisation and management
As part of the ever on-going systematic ﬁre safety work, the tunnel manager should ensure necessary organisational,
administrative and technical measures for safe operation, proper maintenance, and efﬁcient incident and trafﬁc manage-
ment. Training, learning and scenario exercises (tabletop exercises used to practise and evaluate alarm and decision chains)
should be performed to validate and verify that the response to incidents, accidents and emergencies is efﬁcient.
For vulnerable tunnels, exercises and other methods should ensure that the organisation that is created before, during
and after crisis is ﬁt to take appropriate response.
Almost every system is dependent on maintenance and the correct training to be functioning in the intended way when
needed. Organisation and management is largely pro-active which in general makes it very cost efﬁcient and effective albeit
it may be hard to quantitatively assess its utility [26,28].
Veriﬁcation of compliance could be internal and external administrative control [20] including the execution of exercises
and existence of a total quality management (TQM) system such as ISO 9000 [29]. Through training and scenario exercise the
organisation and technical requirements can be logically tested. In the Netherlands, several interesting methods are being
used and developed in this respect [30,31]. Depending on the tunnel class up to three categories of exercises are proposed.
Fig. 3. Summary over the tunnel ﬁre safety guideline.
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process.Limit the generation and spread of ﬁre and smoke
The main requirement of this section is to offer protection against the origin, development, and spread of ﬁre and smoke
within the structure. It can be subdivided in four subsystems: ﬁre compartmentation, wall-lining material, ventilation, and
ﬁxed ﬁre suppression systems (FFFS). Performance-based design methods may be applied or acceptable solutions may be
adopted. Fire compartmentation and wall-lining material are best veriﬁed through standards, e.g. the Eurocode. This ensures
that a ﬁre will not spread or grow with the aid of the wall-lining material, and key structures such as escape route will
endure a certain minimal time.
Fire compartmentation for tunnels primarily aims at protecting life (the spread of ﬁre to other parts of the tunnel is not as
severe as the fact that there already is a ﬁre in the tunnel). EI 60 is recommended as a sensible level of protection in the light
of the dynamics of a tunnel ﬁre. Tunnel ﬁres can be more severe than the ISO 834 standard ﬁre curve (higher temperatures in
the ceiling), but the dynamics of a tunnel ﬁre follows the air ﬂow along the tunnel which means the ﬁre stress and the integ-
rity of wall or doors at a height up to 3 m should not be more severely stressed than a corresponding one hour standard ﬁre.
Depending on other requirements and the overall safety concept of the tunnel certain strategies for the ventilation system
might be necessary to achieve a safe evacuation. Regarding spread and generation of ﬁre a minimal amount of ventilation is
preferable [32–34]. For limiting the generation and spread of ﬁres a FFFS can be very effective [35]. This can also have a po-
sitive effect on other objectives such as evacuation, load-bearing capacity, and the rescue service as the ﬁre, in general, will
be smaller.To provide means for evacuation
The tunnel shall offer the users the possibility to reach a place of safety in the event of an emergency. Evacuees must not
be exposed to falling objects or physical obstructions, high temperature, high heat ﬂux, high levels of toxic gases, or poor
visibility. Veriﬁcation of compliance can either be through the use of acceptable solutions or through performance-based
design.
Evacuation is a difﬁcult area which not only depends on the ﬁre development and technical systems, but also human fac-
tors. In tunnel ﬁres, smoke is what cause fatalities. Life safety is therefore best achieved if evacuation through smoke can be
avoided (this could be a principle deﬁned in the safety concept). Depending on the tunnel and trafﬁc situation this could for
example be achieved in unidirectional tunnels by ensuring that the smoke travels with the trafﬁc ﬂow and that downstream
trafﬁc safely can continue driving. Other tools for improving the smoke conditions in the tunnel can be a FFFS or a one or
two-point smoke extraction system [36]. Thus, the need for veriﬁcation depends on the safety concept and tunnel (e.g. evac-
uation in smoke can theoretically be avoided for unidirectional tunnels without trafﬁc congestion with longitudinal venti-
lation >3 m/s). For the cases when evacuation has to be performed downstream a tunnel tenable conditions for the
evacuees needs to be ensured. This can be achieved by complying with proposed solutions, or through performance-based
design.
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are many aspects that need to be thoroughly considered, for more details consult the guideline report [27]. As the scenarios
are pre-speciﬁed, this sets the level of safety to strive for. To account for the fact that some tunnels bear a higher risk, the risk
classes deﬁned earlier are used to differentiate. Likely ﬁres for tunnels involving single vehicles are a car ﬁre, an HGV ﬁre, or a
bus ﬁre. A relatively large HGV ﬁre (50–100 MW) can be seen as a worst plausible ﬁre. This ﬁre is selected to test the system
for the case when all systems work as intended. This means that if for example an FFFS is installed, the beneﬁts from this can
be accounted for. However, to account for the risk that safety systems may not work as intended, and to aim for a robust
solution, a plausible ﬁre in a car (5–10 MW) is used to stress test the system when one safety system is out of order.
To ensure safety also for vulnerable tunnels, e.g. tunnels under water, more difﬁcult scenarios are used for the stress test.
To account for the inﬂuence from ventilation on the ﬁre size, the ﬁre can be reduced or increased if the ventilation is higher
or lower than 3 m/s. In Table 1 the ﬁre scenarios for the evaluation of life safety are given.To provide means and safety for rescue operations
The main requirement is that the rescue service can undertake life-saving and ﬁre extinguishing activities with satisfac-
torily safety for their personnel. A rescue plan must be drawn up in conjunction with the local rescue service. Furthermore it
must be possible to locate the position of ﬁre, to reach the ﬁre, to have means for controlling the smoke and extinguishment,
and to be able to communicate by radio in the tunnel. To ensure the safety of rescue personnel several measures can be
taken: a ventilation system can control the heat and smoke, FFFS can reduce the ﬁre size and cool the ﬁre and structure,
and the load-bearing capacity should be in relation to their need. This requirement can be veriﬁed and developed through
scenario exercises, training or by other means.To ensure load-bearing capacity of the construction
The ﬁnal key performance parameter is the load-bearing capacity. The main goal with this requirement is that the load-
bearing capacity of the construction can be assumed during the event of ﬁre. A collapse or partial collapse could lead to time
consuming reparations or refurbishments which, from a socio-economic perspective can be very expensive. This was not
least the case with Mont Blanc after the ﬁre in 1999 the tunnel remained closed for three years. In the developed guideline
two methods are proposed to verify that the load-bearing capacity is sufﬁcient. The ﬁrst method is based on a time-temper-
ature curve which the design should handle for a speciﬁed amount of time. Choosing between standardised ﬁre curves, the
HC-curve deﬁned in EN 1991-1-2 was selected. However, tunnel ﬁres can be more severe than the HC-curve why the RWS
curve sometimes is proposed [27]. At the other extreme the ISO 834 standard curve is sometimes used for tunnels although it
underestimates the ceiling temperature considerable. A drawback with the RWS curve is that it has such fast temperature
increase that the material values of Eurocode do not apply. A second important design ﬁre parameter is the length of ﬁre
exposure. Vehicles involved in a tunnel ﬁre are likely to burn intensively for less than one hour [37], however, during this
time the ceiling temperature can be as high as 1350 C. In the design guide we have proposed to use the HC-curve. To ac-
count for differences in tunnel risks, longer time periods are proposed for tunnels with a higher risk, see Table 2 below. How-
ever, to use a pre-speciﬁed ﬁre curve is a crude approach as neither the tunnel cross-section, ventilation, tunnel ﬁre
dynamics, or any FFFS are considered. Therefore, a more performance-based approach is also suggested.
In the performance-based approach the ceiling temperature is calculated from a set of representative scenarios for the
load-bearing capacity. In the calculation method, originally proposed by Li and Ingason [38], parameters such as ventilation,
ﬁre size, and tunnel geometry are accounted for. This will lead to a unique time-temperature curve for the speciﬁc tunnel in
question. Scenarios for evaluation of the performance-based design are, as for veriﬁcation of life safety, pre-speciﬁed, see
Table 3.
In Table 4 below the key performance parameters are summarised in terms of performance criteria, method for veriﬁca-
tion, the purpose and effect on other systems.Table 1
Proposed ﬁre scenarios for performance-based veriﬁcation of life safety.
Scenario group Heat release rate Fire growth Yields and heat of combustion
1 A goods vehicle ﬁre
TA: 100 MW
TB: 75 MW
TC: 50 MW
TA and TB: a = 0.19 kW/s2.
For tunnels with longitudinal
air ﬂow less than 1.5 m/s:
a = 0.047 kW/s2
TC: a = 0.047 kW/s2
YCO2 = 2.5 g/g, YCO = 0.1 g/g, YSot = 0.1 g/g,
YHCN = 0.01 g/g Hec = 25 MJ/kg
2 A car ﬁre
TA: 10 MW
TB: 7.5 MW
TC: 5 MW
All tunnel classes: a = 0.047 kW/s2
Table 2
Proposed ﬁre scenarios for veriﬁcation of sufﬁcient load-bearing capacity.
Tunnel class Not sensitive to collapsea Sensitive to collapsea
TA 120 minutes, HC-curve 180 minutes, HC-curve
TB 90 minutes, HC-curve 180 minutes, HC-curve
TC 60 minutes, HC-curve 180 minutes, HC-curve
a A collapse-sensitive tunnel is one that passes underneath a water body, or which
would create serious consequential effects in the event of a collapse, or where there are
buildings above the tunnel.
Table 3
Proposed ﬁre scenarios for veriﬁcation of sufﬁcient load-bearing capacity.
Scenario group Not sensitive to collapsea Sensitive to collapsea
1 100 MW and 500 GJ goods vehicle ﬁre, a = 0.19 kW/s2 100 MW and 1000 GJ goods vehicle ﬁre, a = 0.19 kW/s2
2 10 MW and 20 GJ car ﬁre, a = 0.047 kW/s2 100 MW and 500 GJ goods vehicle ﬁre, a = 0.19 kW/s2
a A collapse-sensitive tunnel is one that passes underneath a water body, or which would create serious consequential effects in the event of a collapse, or
where there are buildings above the tunnel.
Table 4
The key performance requirements that make up tunnel ﬁre safety.
Requirement Suggested method for
veriﬁcation
Performance Purpose and effect on other
requirements
1. Organisation &
Management
Internal and external
administrative controls,
planning, training, scenario and
emergency exercises, TQM
system
Efﬁcient handling of different
sets of scenarios depending on
tunnel class
Almost all tunnel functions
depend on this requirement. It
should therefore have the
highest priority
2.1 Fire compartmentation Standard/testing EI 60 or E 30 with FFSS (ISO 834) Primarily ensure safe escape
route and safe functioning of
safety systems
2.2 Wall-lining material Standard/testing Eurocode classes, see report [27] Should not ignite easily or
contribute to ﬁre spread
2.3 Ventilation (not
necessarily a
requirement)
Overall safety concept to
evaluate the need, International
standards and simulation for
system veriﬁcation
Prescriptive: acceptable solution
100 (20) MW ﬁre for
longitudinal (transverse) system.
Performance-based design:
aiming at fulﬁlling requirements
for which ventilation is
necessary.
Support evacuation and rescue
service. Ventilation can increase
the risk for ﬁre spread
2.4 FFFS Simulation/testing/calculations Depending on purpose Cool the ﬁre, surfaces and ﬁre
fumes. Improves the conditions
for generation and spread of ﬁre
and smoke, load-bearing
capacity, evacuation and rescue
service
3. Provide means for
evacuation
Prescriptive veriﬁcation:
acceptable solutions, or
Performance-based veriﬁcation:
Scenario-based risk analysis (or
other suitable method)
Prescriptive: compliance with
acceptable solutions, or
Scenario-based risk analysis:
Tenable conditions for
evacuation for applicable
scenarios, see Table 1
Tunnel users should be able to
safely evacuate the tunnel
without being exposed to
untenable conditions
4. Provide means and safety
for the rescue service
Prescriptive requirements in
tandem with training, scenario
and emergency exercises
Efﬁcient and safe handling of
different scenarios
Saving life, property and
environment in the event of
accidents, taking account of the
risks for the rescue personnel
5 Ensure load-bearing
capacity of the
construction
Prescriptive veriﬁcation: Testing
or inquiry, or
Performance-based veriﬁcation:
Scenario-based risk analysis (or
other suitable method)
Prescriptive: Ensure load-bearing
capacity for the ﬁxed time-
temperature curve, see Table 2.
Scenario-based risk analysis:
Load-bearing capacity ensured
for selected scenarios, see
Table 3
Prevent collapse and large socio-
economic consequences, enable
evacuation and rescue service
intervention
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The advantage with performance-based design is that speciﬁc solutions appropriate for the actual circumstances can be
engineered. However, the disadvantage is that veriﬁcation is more difﬁcult. In contrast a prescriptive approach is easier to
verify and is usually based on practice from what has worked before, which means that it is robust for standard application,
but may be a poor solution under new circumstances.
Another difference between the two approaches for veriﬁcation is that technical changes or coupling effects between
safety systems aiming at different main requirements can be accounted for in a performance-based approach. For example,
if FFFS is installed in the tunnel it affects several other parameters such as the ﬁre size which might result in a prescriptive
solution becoming obsolete or unnecessary conservative.
Some requirements in the guideline are still more prescriptive than performance-based, this is most often due to that
there are prescriptive legal requirements which need to be fulﬁlled and/or because no clear and veriﬁable performance-
based requirements could be formulated. However, another solution which often has been applied is that prescriptive legal
requirements are made into recommended acceptable solutions and a parallel performance-based requirement. In legal
terms this should be satisfactory as the European directive on tunnel safety [2], as well as some Swedish laws, opens up
for alternative solutions provided that the alternative measures will result in equivalent or improved protection, i.e. if the
performance-based requirement is satisfactorily met. One interesting example is ventilation which is regulated in several
paragraphs in the EC directive although, in terms of performance-based thinking, ventilation is just a means to reach several
other goals. Therefore the EC requirements on ventilation are turned into a recommendation of an acceptable solution, while
several performance-based requirements, e.g. means for evacuation, decide the requirements for ventilation in a perfor-
mance-based solution.
In relation to the safety circle, all but the requirement on organisation and management deal with preparation, mitiga-
tion, and intervention. This likely has to do with the current paradigm being consequence-focused, as was noticed in the pre-
study [4]. If current laws are used as guiding principles the result will focus on the same thing as the laws. On the other hand,
organisation and management covers all aspects of the safety circle but mitigation.
From a legal perspective and from the tradition in Sweden there is little encouragement in using other engineering meth-
ods than risk analysis for achieving safety (e.g. fail-safe design, inherent safety, or Systems Engineering). Based on reference
group meetings and interviews it also seems that there is much room for improvement of TQM systems and administrative
controls [28]. As a consequence we often speak about ‘veriﬁcation of safety’, however for performance-based design one
should also consider validation. Veriﬁcation in engineering commonly refers to ‘‘are you building it right?’’, while validation
refers to the question ‘‘are you building the right thing?’’ Systems engineering, for example, is one ﬁeld that systematically
deals with these two issues. However, Scenario exercises, and emergency exercises are two methods from the guideline that
highlight the issue of validation, even if different exercises in reality can give results related also to veriﬁcation. Scenario
exercise can be used early in the design to highlight different essential functions and needs. Emergency exercises can be
carried out once the design is ready and validate the ﬁnal installations and overall organisation.
The sometimes recommended method for performance-based veriﬁcation, scenario-based risk analysis, is in Paté-Cor-
nell’s classiﬁcation either a level 1, 2, or 3 analysis in relation to how uncertainties are treated. There are many different
models available for tunnel risk analysis at level 4 which, at the moment are being in the development or maturing phase
[39], why the expected outcome can differ by several orders of magnitude [25,40]. Below follows a discussion of the reason
for these uncertainties and its implication for the choice of method.
For tunnel risk analysis epistemic, aleatory and operational uncertainty can be expected to be large. The epistemic uncer-
tainty is large as large tunnel ﬁres happen very seldom. Furthermore, old data may not ﬁt to new tunnels. The epistemic
uncertainty is large as the theory and models on ﬁre development, human behaviour and structural stability is limited. Fire
modelling started to be developed in the 1970’s and is now widely used in ﬁre sciences. However, a round-robin study in
2007 on an enclosure ﬁre where ten teams simulated the same ﬁre given the same information shows disappointing result.
The time to ﬂash-over varied from no ﬂashover to 850 s where the real time was 300 s. The maximum smoke layer temper-
ature varied between 211 C and 1170 C where the real temperature was 750 C. The HRR curve from the ten teams looks
like a scatter plot between 1 MW and 10 MW. As the HRR curve determines many other parameters, the prediction of any
parameter varies signiﬁcantly. Their conclusion is that there is an inherent difﬁculty in predicting ﬁre dynamics [41]. As
tunnels differ from buildings in several respects and are less researched we can expect even larger uncertainties.
The ﬁrst response, from the 18th century, to understanding human behaviour in ﬁre was simply to label it as panic; an
irrational behaviour involving the breakdown of group ties and acts on self-preservations at all costs. Another naive ap-
proach is what is often called the physical science model, in which humans are simpliﬁed to rational dots starting to move
to the nearest exit as soon as the ﬁre alarm sounds. As a response to these two approaches, starting from the late 1960’s,
several less naive models for describing human behaviour have been developed, e.g. [42–45]. However, computer models
for ﬁre evacuation are still at the level of the physical science model which is a very simplistic way of modelling human
behaviour in ﬁres [46,47].
The operational uncertainty is high as a result of the lack of precision and knowledge arising from the two sections above.
Therefore, many critical assumptions has to be made and as a result the uncertainty in risk estimates is large [25,40]. An
important category of accidents involving multiple vehicles is particularly bound with uncertainties at the present [25]. This
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consequences, prediction of fatalities and injuries is difﬁcult, as is modelling of human behaviour, exposure and effect on
humans. Despite these uncertainties, many countries use system-based approaches, for example The Netherlands, Austria,
Switzerland and Norway [25,40].
From the paragraphs above, some reasons for recommending a scenario-based risk analysis can be identiﬁed as follows.
As the scenarios are pre-speciﬁed in the guideline the epistemic uncertainty from estimating the likelihood of ﬁre size is re-
moved from the operation of the analyst. Concerning the veriﬁcation of load-bearing capacity a method derived from exper-
imental data for calculating the resulting time-temperature exposure is proposed by the design guide, this means that the
uncertainty from various ﬁre modelling activities is reduced. Concerning the veriﬁcation of life safety the yields for various
toxic substances are speciﬁed which means that simpler models may be used and the operational uncertainty and assump-
tions are reduced. Several recommendations are given concerning what factors to account for when human behaviour is
modelled although no speciﬁc model or formula is speciﬁed. That no model or formula is speciﬁed for human behaviour
is probably the greatest source of operational and epistemic uncertainty of the proposed performance-based design guide.
Conclusions
A Swedish framework for a performance-based design guide for tunnels has been proposed. The framework is presented
in detail in the report [27]. The framework allows for both prescriptive and performance-based design depending on the
need. From the framework eight key performance parameters are identiﬁed.
The idea of the tunnel guideline and Swedish building regulation is to let the designer choose which veriﬁcation principle
to use for each affected requirement. In the regulation this is achieved by presenting performance-based requirements to-
gether with acceptable solutions as recommendations. This means that one can either choose to implement the acceptable
solution(s) to automatically fulﬁl the requirement, or one could engineer another solution using performance-based design
to verify that the performance-based requirement is achieved. The advantage compared with current, more prescriptive,
framework is that more efﬁcient solutions taking account of actual risks and needs can be engineered.
For veriﬁcation of performance-based requirements through risk analysis there are considerable operational, epistemic,
and aleatory uncertainties. By aiming at the simpler risk analysis methods, e.g. scenario-based risk analysis, and by offering
guidance or ﬁxed values on several input variables it is argued that some of the operational and epistemic uncertainties are
reduced. Other methods, e.g. scenario exercise, STAMP and emergency exercises, addressing validation and organisational
factors are an indispensable compliment.
The vision for further studies is to develop the design process, and from a socio-economic and quality perspective balance,
or optimize, possible safety measures.
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